The Housing Boom and Bust
The financial crisis explained while it was still smoking. Sowell on who actually built the housing collapse, and the political fingerprints all over it.
- Interviewer
- Peter Robinson
- Program
- Uncommon Knowledge
- Topics
- Economics, Politics
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Lightly cleaned for reading (52 of Sowell’s turns). Tap any timestamp to jump the video there.
Welcome to Uncommon Knowledge. I'm Peter Robinson. Before we begin, I wanna let you know that you can follow us on Twitter now at twitter.com/uncommonknowledge. Send us your comments, links related to mat- material we discuss, suggestions for upcoming guests. Uncommon Knowledge on Twitter. Today, Dr. Thomas Sowell is my guest. Thomas Sowell has taught economics, intellectual history, and social policy at institutions that include Cornell, UCLA, and Amherst. Now a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Dr. Sowell has published more than a dozen books, including his latest, The Housing Boom and Bust. Segment one: the economics of the housing boom. I quote you to yourself, Tom, from The Housing Boom and Bust. Quote, "Although the housing boom and bust has national repercussions, its origins tended to be concentrated in particular places." Explain that.
Yes. Most of the, - adventurous financing was, it was in, concentrated in places like coastal California, Phoenix, a few places in Florida. and this is where, the great bulk of the, defaults and foreclosures occurred as well in la- in later years. in fact, you can break it down even finer that, it's in particular counties in these states. So really a very small part of the United States generated, the delinquencies, the defaults, and the foreclosures, which then snowballed across the country through the financial system and even spread overseas. But the origins were in these extremely expensive areas, where the prices had been forced up artificially and where people in desperation had turned to all kinds of, creative financing, such as no money down, you know, adjustable rate mortgages, subprime mortgages, all sorts of gimmicks in order to buy a house to live in or, and this is, this would be true of about, oh, at least 20% of the people who bought houses during the boom. -hmm. As pure speculation. So that given the lax lending standards, a speculator could come in and buy four or five expensive houses with a r- relatively small amount of money down, spruce them up, and sell them with- Flip them... yeah, within a very short time.
Tom, you mentioned, the phrase you used there just a moment ago, that the prices in these small number of housing markets, the prices had been driven artificially high.
Yes.
And I have to say, in reading The Housing Boom and Bust, you and I both live in coastal California. Yes. And a lot of what you said cut pretty close to the bone here. You're tell- a- as you sit across the table from a man with a gigantic mortgage, why did those hou- why were the housing prices artificially high in that handful of markets?
Because, despite the abundance of land in California, laws prevented people from building on much of that land, and made it prohibitively expensive on the rest of the land so that the housing, - Prices were pri- shot up primarily because the land on which the houses were built were tremendously expensive.
So the whole open space movement.
Oh, yes. And I lived in one of those houses on the Stanford campus, and I remember, this shows how long ago it was. The house was $260,000. and, I saw on my insurance that it was, it was, insured for only 60,000. So that's the cost of replacing the house. Right. The other 200 grand was for the leasing of the land. I didn't even own the land.. and so it's the land that, that is really the key to this, to this whole thing. That same house, incidentally, I'm told now has sold for over a million dollars, even though it's, less than 2,000 square feet.
All right. I quote you again, "Some of the least knowledgeable and least experienced homebuyers were now financing their purchases with some of the newest and most complicated mortgages."
Yes. of course, the whole notion was that you wanted to make housing affordable to people who otherwise couldn't, buy, which meant low-income people, often people of limited education, people who had never bought a house before. And so they were presented with these complicated, mortgages that often began with very low initial rates. So you'll pay $500 a month for this house, but, in six more months you'll be paying 800, and then at the end of a year you'll be paying 1,200, and two years later you'll be paying 1,500. Well, not everybody may have understood all that. And when the, when it started going up like that, you know, the whole thing started to collapse.
Yeah. You also write, "At the other end of the knowledge scale..." You're talking about purchasers.
hmm.
a lot of purchasers, unsophisticated, just didn't understand these complicated instruments. At the other end of the knowledge scale, sophisticated firms like Moody's and Standard & Poor's had only a very limited amount of hard data available to use when making ratings of stocks and bonds that were based on new and exotic mortgages.
Yes. in other words, the rating companies had, decades, even generations of data on what happens with regular 30-year fixed rate mortgages with 20% down.
Right.
So, and so they used that to try to guess what it would be like with these new exotic mortgages with all kinds of complications. someone who once worked for Moody's described it as, using a century's worth of data on weather in Antarctica to predict the weather in Hawaii. And it didn't work out.
All right. Now, so you've got... I'm trying l- construct the layers of the problem. Specific housing markets in the United States, coastal California being one- -hmm... where because, largely because of government interference in the first place- Yes... if that's the correct way to put it- Yes... the open space. artificial or government-imposed restrictions on land drives up land prices. People in those housing markets become desperate. W- what step is next? Institutions begin lending to them newer and more and more creative kinds of loans, but there's a step here. Somebody's encouraging those institutions to do so.
Oh, absolutely, not, more than encouraging. the government required people, by the 1990s to, s- supply data on people to whom they were lending. the race, the income, the communities in which the people were located, and if those numbers didn't suit the government, the banks could get, have, great trouble getting government permission to do things that other businesses can do without government permission. but which the banks being regulated had to depend on approval from the Federal Reserve or- Okay... from whomever else was involved.
So this brings us to segment two, which is also the title of the second chapter in The Housing Boom and Bust, which is the politics of the housing boom. You just made an absolutely critical point. Banks have a closer relationship to government than many other sectors in the private economy because...
Because the banks are regulated by the government, and the banks can only make certain decisions if the government says yes. If one bank wants to, merge with another bank, they can't just call up their lawyers and arrange it. They've gotta go to the re- government regulators, and if the government regulators approve it, then they can do it. Otherwise, they can't.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, what are they and what role did they play?
These are two government-sponsored enterprises which purchase, mortgages from banks and other lenders. And so, as these more risky mortgages come along, the, the banks don't hold onto those mortgages. In other words, the bank may lend to you or to me, knowing that we are risky, p- borrowers. But they sell the, they sell the mortgage to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. They get their money right then and there, and it's up to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to collect on those mortgages over the next 30 years.
So let me make sure I have the sequence right. Housing price is extremely high. Congress- -hmm... am- among other en- entities, Congress places pressure on the banking system, the ordinary retail banking system-... to make loans to, more and more affordable. Banks respond to this pressure by coming up with all kinds of creative instruments. They're given permission to take... They... So a retail bank sells a mortgage, and then the retail bank flips it to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac- Yeah... which essentially package huge numbers of these mortgages across the country. Yes. That's the correct sequence?
Yes.
When you called Freddie Mae and f- Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac government-sponsored enterprises Is that the term? Explain what that means.
There's a, there's... They have a relationsh- special relationship- Yes... with the government, right?
The, the government created these organizations, and yet they are private profit-making institutions. But the government is involved with them. It's a hybrid kind of institution, not completely private, not completely government.
And the relevance of that is that investors have presupposed throughout the existence of these two entities that the government would be very hesitant to let them go down.
absolutely. More than that, they get certain privileges. They're, they're, they're not regulated as tightly as the, as the ordinary banks would be. And so, because of... They have, I believe, something like a two bill- had something like a $2 billion, line of credit at the Treasury. I mean, we could all use a $2 billion- Yes.... line of credit with the Treasury. But not all of us somehow get it. and so, they have these advantages over other m- mortgage buyers. and then what you say is the crucial thing, which is that- Investors will invest in these, companies, relying on the fact that the government is not gonna let them go, let them fail. Whereas, the government will let some banks fail.
Right. L- let's consider a few of the public f- officials involved here. Congressman Barney Fa- Frank of Massachusetts speaking in 2003, quote, "I would like to get Fannie and Freddie more deeply into helping low-income housing."
Yes. "
I want to roll the dice a little bit more in this situation towards subsidized housing." Close quote. What was Congressman Frank thinking?
He was thinking of getting reelected. Because when you do favors of people, those people are more likely to contribute to your campaigns. They're more likely to vote for you if they're in your district. And so, all of this is perfectly understandable from the standpoint of Congressman Barney Frank. So is his more recent statement that he wants the, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to, lower their lending standards for condos now. In other words, lowering the standards for housing was such a big success, he's now gonna move on to the condos. I s- presumably he'll w- eventually get to the apartments.
All right. The 43rd president of the United States, George W. Bush. You write, quote, "President George W. Bush joined the push for more homeownership." Close quote.
Yes.
How come?
You'll have to ask him that. I know of no rational explanation. but his point was that he wanted more people to be able to own homes. This is, this is the magic thing about politics. You set one goal, and you don't worry about the repercussions. It was like Admiral Farragut saying, "Full steam ahead. Damn the torp-" Damn the torpedoes... "torpedoes." Right. And of course, the torpedoes got us. But, he w- he wanted the federal government, particularly the Federal Housing Administration, to make loans s- so that people could buy a house without a down payment. He thought a down payment was just one of those fussy things that the market had come up with, you know? And, and we l- w- as so often happens-
You're being very rough on him. This was at the compassionate part of-... compassionate conservatism. He was trying to make the conservative free market position more palatable for voters as a whole, and this was one of the ways in which he did so. Was it politically understandable?
It was polit- Most disasters are politically understandable.
All right. Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank from 1987 to 2006. You quote him in t- The Housing Boom and Bust as saying during a television interview, this is Alan Greenspan, quote, "While I was aware a lot of these practices," this lending, "were going on, I had no notion of how significant they had become until very late. I really didn't get it until very late in 2005 and 2006." Should Greenspan have gotten it a lot earlier?
A lot of other people got it a lot earlier. But on the other hand, I think a- as compared to members of Congress, he was way in advance. Well- Because while he was warning Congress that there was problems down the road, especially with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, he was saying, "There's no immediate problem, but if this continues on to the end of the decade," which is where we're n- approaching right now, "it's gonna be a disaster."
Now, Barney Frank, George W. Bush, Alan Greenspan, of those three, who was the worst actor?
Oh, Barney Frank, easily.
Okay. And of those three, whom does the press still listen to and-
Barney Frank.
Thank you, Tom. Segment three, the housing bust. In segment one, you talked about how the h- house of cards was, grew up. Now, how it collapsed. Thomas Sowell in The Housing Boom and Bust, quote, "In just one year, home prices fell by 27% in San Diego, 28% in Los Angeles, and 31% in San Francisco. In Dallas, the home price decline was only 3%." Why that discrepancy?
Oh, because Dallas wasn't part of the boom, and it wasn't part of the bust.
How come?
And it... Because in Dallas, they don't have the, restrictions on building houses that we have in coastal California. Houston was, is very similar. Houston doesn't even have zoning laws, and so therefore, if people wanted more houses in Dallas or Houston, the builders just built more houses, and the prices didn't rise.
Supply is able to adjust to demand- That's it... much more easily, much more easily- Yes... in those markets. All right. Tom Sowell again, quote, "Locally sharp declines in housing prices had national repercussions because the inflated values of houses in these places were accepted by national organizations like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and by Wall Street firms that bought such mortgages and then created and sold securities based on the inflated values of these mortgages," close quote. Okay. You can argue that the government messes things up by driving up housing prices in certain markets.. You can government... argue that the government, largely in the person of Barney Frank, messes things up by encouraging Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to make loans, t- to make a market in loans that shouldn't really have been made in the first place. Yeah. But then you come to the third part of this sort of triad of-... of absurdity, and what you get to is great big financial institutions with extremely well-paid individuals in a presumably free, pure free market, and they make mistakes as idiotic as anybody else. They're holding instruments they can't value. How come the mark- d- in other words, I'm a disciple of Milton Friedman. I can understand it when the government messes up. Yeah. It's much harder to understand when the free market messes up.
Oh, well, for one thing, the, the rating companies who rate these bonds, the government restricted them to three... There were three r- rating agencies you had to use, and if you, and if you used those three agencies, then the, everything would be approved by the regulators. But if you wanted a Joe Smith and, you know, out in Silicon Valley who has his own rating agency that says these, mortgages aren't worth anything, he may be right, but you can't use him. And so now, now this happens. But I think, -
So the government restricted the most important aspect of a free market, which is information, pricing information.
Yes.
People, there were plenty of people who knew better.
But largely for, because of government regulations, principal actors in the market had to pretend they didn't know any better.
Well, the, I wouldn't say that Moody's and the others were pretending. they really just didn't know.. In other words, there were, there was not enough data on these things. You see, in other words, with conventional mortgages, you had data covering peace and war, prosperity and depression, and so forth, and you could follow these data back for decades. and you'd have some pretty good idea what different kinds of mortgages do, behave like over a period of time. There was no such record, and so they were going by guess and by golly. But because they had such a strong, good reputation f- on the basis of their ratings of other kinds of securities, people just took them at their word.
And-
They could've been more cautious.
Right. Right.
They should've been more cautious.
So I guess here's what I'm trying to say is at a number of places in the sequence of events that leads to the housing bust-... it is very clear to see the hand of government, in effect, messing things up- Yes distorting price signals-... making it impossible for the market to respond as it otherwise would have. -hmm, got it. At one end of it, though, and that's the Wall Street end- -hmm... it's much harder to see a direct government interference. And so do we wanna say, do you wanna argue that's just one instance of- One of those bubbles, one of those manias that takes place even in free markets, like the tulip-
Oh, there's no, there's no question There's
no
question about that. There, no ques- no question.
Okay. Okay, so it is not the burden of your argument that markets work almost flawlessly if only the government would get out of the way. In this case, we have an example where even markets, human institutions- Right... as they are, messed up, right?
Abso- absolutely. Okay. th- but there's also the case that the origin- that the original problem went back to the mortgages. Right. So long as people paid their mortgages, all was well. But when you start lending to people who aren't likely to repay the mortgages, then downstream the question is, are there any correctives down there? And the answer to that wa- is there wasn't.
Right. in March 2008, Bush's Treasury Secretary, Hank Paulson, intervened to prevent Bear Stearns, we're at Wall Street now, one of the gigantic financial institutions, from collapsing altogether. -hmm. He arranges a sale, not quite a forced sale, but a fire sale, let's call it, to JP Morgan. So the institution, the accounts remain in, they remain alive. In September 2008, Paulson refuses to arrange any such sale for Lehman Brothers, permitting Lehman Brothers to declare bankruptcy.
hmm.
Which of those two steps was correct?
Wow. I'd have to know an awful lot more about the intricacies of those particular firms to say. But what, but what is quite clear is that it left in the hands of the government the ability to pick winners and losers, and that is a very dangerous, power, not only in terms of the economic decisions that can be made, but also in terms of people being able to throw their weight around in ways that the Constitution never authorized them to do.
Segment four, the New Deal ideal. you argue in The Housing Boom and Bust that a lot of the thinking that implicitly and in times ex- explicitly underlies the Obama administration's approach to the current economic crisis arises from Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal. And I quote you, "The advocates of Obama p- Obama's policies," quote, "cite Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal as a model," close quote. Why? What is it about the New Deal that permits people to cite it as a model with a straight face eight decades after it was enacted?
Because of the widespread belief that it was the New Deal which saved the country and got us out of the Depression. And, and the more- You mean it wasn't?
in politics, what matters is not what the facts are. What matters is what people believe, because people vote on the basis of what they believe and not on the basis of what the facts are.
All right. This is, in my judgment, this is critical. This is one of the most important aspects of this marvelous book, The Housing Boom and Bust. You write, Tom, quote, "The larger question that remains as relevant as ever, eight decades after the enactment of the New Deal, was it the failure of the free market that led to the massive unemployment which persisted throughout the 1930s, or was the Great Depression prolonged by the government interventions that were intended to shorten it?" Close quote. And your analysis is as follows
Well, w- there are a lot of ways of going at this. One is to look at, look at the sequence of events. Right. And we can look at, look at the sequence. In October 1929, the stock market crashed. Two months later, unemployment peaked at 9%. Over the next several months, the unemployment began to subside irregularly, down to 6.3% by June of 1930. so eight months after the stock market crash, we have not yet hit double digits in unemployment. June 1930, when it's 6.3%, the government intervenes. First, the first real, intervention on a massive scale under Hoover, the Smoot-Hawley tariffs, which were designed to, reduce unemployment by restricting i- imports in the United States so that more of these goods will be built in the United States by American workers. It sounds good. A thousand economists from the leading universities around the country signed a public appeal to Congress and the president not to pass this bill, that it would not do what they said it would do. It would not r- reduce unemployment. it would, in fact, lead to retaliation that would make it harder for Americans to sell their goods in other countries. As often happens, no one paid the slightest attention. The bill was passed, and, within five months after the bill was passed, we had double-digit unemployment for the first time. This is from a bill designed to lower unemployment. Right. And when it hit... And this time, it did not subside. It never fell below double digits for the entire remainder of the decade of the '30s, not even for a single month. not all of it was the Ha- Smoot-Hawley tariff. When FDR came in '33, he then put in the National Industrial Recovery Act. He put in the, Agricultural Adjustment Act. He put in the Wagner Act. He issued more presidential, executive orders than all subsequent presidents throughout the remainder of the 20th century. So the government intervened on a massive scale, and yet the unemployment never came down below double digits for the entire decade.
So we get the stock market crash in '29. -hmm. Herbert Hoover, as president, understands that something terrible has happened, but fundamentally, the policies in place are those of Calvin Coolidge and every president before, small federal government. -hmm. And we see signs that the market begins to correct itself. Right. The economy begins to recover, and then Herbert Hoover and Congress decide what to do to fix things.
Yes.
And they immediately make things worse, and Franklin Roosevelt comes in and keeps fixing it and keeps fixing it and keeps fixing it, and it stays bad, bad.
Yes.
That's a fair assessment?
Yes.
Okay. So then we have to move on to the next question, which is, well then, what did end the Great Depression? If it wasn't the New Deal, it's a, it's over by the middle of the... Unemployment is down to, - Almost... close to zero by the middle of the war.
Yes.
So what happened?
The war.
The war happened.
But the question is, what about the war?
Well, yes. Right. Be- go ahead.
Well, one of the things that the war did that most people seem not, not to, notice is that it took 12 million men out of the civilian labor force and put them in uniform.
That'll help your unemployment figures.
It will. Right. Yes. FDR actually put his finger on, on something that other people overlook, and he had a wonderful statement about how with the coming of the war, Dr., Dr. New Deal was replaced by Dr. Win the War. And what that meant is the war put an end to the New Deal, and when you put... And moreover, it went the other direction. Instead of creating all this uncertainty, which all this intervention does, quite aside from the merits of the particular interventions, it gave a tremendous certainty because it began the practice of cost plus contracts for military's, equipment suppliers. And so if you signed a contract with the government for a million dollars, you were guaranteed you'd get your million dollars back, plus whatever profit they allowed in the contract So before, you see, because of all the anti-business rhetoric, you never... W- o- once you start intervening, it's not just a question of the merit of the particular intervention, it's the fact that nobody knows when you're gonna intervene again. And that's true now. That, you know, this whole thing about... N- no one said that you could fire the ch- the head of General Motors by giving them this money. But once they decided they're gonna do it, they can do it. And so nobody knows what's gonna happen next.
Segment five, what Obama is up to. Having demolished the New Deal, we now turn to-... President Obama. Thomas Sowell, quote, "Shortly before the Obama administration took office, the man who would become President Obama's chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel, said, quote, 'You never want a serious crisis to go to waste.'" Close quote. Why do you find that significant?
Because it means that the crisis is presenting them with an opportunity to do things they wouldn't be able to do otherwise, and that's how he sees it. And everything that has happened since the, new administration indicates that's how the administration as a whole sees it.
So the crisis is providing an opportunity for President Obama and his supporters to do what they would have liked to do- Yes but would otherwise have been unable to do.
Just as in the case of the New Deal. That the, the New Dealers, mo- most of the key people in the New Deal, were for big government intervention long before there was a stock market crash. It's just that the stock market crash gave them an opportunity to step in. It's, another parallel is that people are talking about all these high, these highly intelligent people with whom the president has surrounded himself, in Wash- FDR surrounded himself with highly intelligent people. that is no guarantee of anything, except for brilliant rationalizations for failure in some cases.
All right. L- let me push back a little bit, Tom. When President Obama took office, the financial system appeared close to collapse. Serious economists, including our colleague at the Hoover Institution, Robert Barro, wrote that there was a significant chance of not just recession, but depression. And today we've got a financial system that's functioning. Housing prices are settling rather than crashing, and there seems to be a general consensus that we'll see a recovery within a year to 18 months. So why not take President Obama at his word and simply impute to him the motives that he claims? He came into office, passed a stimulus bill, and a raft of other measures because of the financial crisis demanded that he do so, and it seems to have worked.
Well, I, I'm not as optimistic in, in predicting how things are gonna be wonderful in a, in a couple of years. But we'll know more in a couple of years. - If you look at the stimulus package, the one thing it has not done is stimulate. prior to the, bailout money for the banks, the banks were lending a certain amount. After the bailout b- money, the banks were lending less. suppose, s- I mean, a stimulus means that he's not depending just on the government's own money being spent producing the result, that this will stimulate others in the economy. It is not. Money, the circulation of money, the speed with which money circulates in the economy fell to the lowest level in 50 years. It fell during the-
After the stimulus.
Yes. business reduced its investment by, oh, something like 25 or more percent, so that if you're looking in terms of what actually happens rather than the words that are used, what actually has happened shows, no such stimulation as they, as they're talking about.
Let me mention a few administration economic proposals, all couched in terms of controlling cost and spurring growth, all linked in one way or another to the economic crisis that was started during the housing bust. You tell me what you believe the American people should understand about each we've talked about the stimulus. You made it clear you don't believe it's stimulative at all. The cap and trade global warming bill that just passed the House-... in late June and now moves to the Senate. The New York Times says the legislation, quote, "Falls far short of what many European governments and environmentalists have said is needed to avert the..." Don't make me laugh, Tom. "To avert the worst effects of global warming." Close quote. What does Tom Sowell have to say about this cap and trade legislation?
Oh, it's a wonderful way to raise money, to raise money without saying that you're taxing people. whether it will in fact cut down on, the greenhouse gases significantly, and whether if it, even if it does, whether that will really, be enough, 'cause after all, we are only a small part of the world. To, to affect the entire temperature of the earth, it seems quite dubious. despite the sort of, notion that, it's a proven fact that manmade factors create, global warming, there are literally hundreds of people who spend their lives specializing in the study of climate who say, no, that is not the case.
Healthcare reform. - President Obama said in late June that he's determined to enact a major reform before the end of the summer. From barackobama.com, quote, "A moral imperative by any measure, a better healthcare s- by any measure," mark that, Dr. Sowell, "a better healthcare system is also essential to rebuilding our economy. We want to make health insurance work for people and businesses, not just insurance and drug companies." Close quote.
Oh, boy. It's, it's hard to even know where to start. - It really is. I, first of all, what earthly reason is there to believe that the government, of all institutions, can make healthcare m- less expensive? It can refuse to pay the expenses, which is entirely different. Other countries have gone that route. They have refused to pay the cost of maintaining the health system, and so, in places like Britain or Canada, you don't find the same availability of healthcare that you have in the United States. You have something like, something like, recently s- studies show that 30,000 Canadians, have gone to other countries for health treatment even though they get it free of charge in Canada, and they've gotta go pay for it somewhere else, and they go, because the quality is not the same. the MRIs per capita in Canada are about half what they are in the United States, and Britain, which also has a government health program, they're about a fourth of what they are in the United States. If you're talking about going in for surgery, s- I don't have the exact figures right in front of me, but, something like, a fourth of the people in Canada, wait six months or more for surgery. For surgery. in Britain, it's a higher percentage. In the United States, only 5% wait that long. In Canada, you wait 10 weeks for an MRI to find out what's wrong with you. Now, a lot of things can happen in 10 weeks, and many of them are very bad. So, if you want something cheaper, you can always get something cheaper. it's just that you're not gonna get the same quality. In or- in order for them to bring down the cost of healthcare, the government would have to operate the system more efficiently than the market does. I can't think of anything that the government operates more efficiently than the market does. And if it's all, you see the profits of the oil- of the, pharmaceutical companies and the hospitals and all that, there are thousands of non-profit organizations in this country. If the profits are the problem, the non-profit organizations could go in, undercut these people who are making these unwarranted prof- profits, and lower the cost to us all. Why don't they do it?
Final question, Tom, and this is from a viewer, who sent in a question by Twitter- -huh... to be submitted to you. This is from Andrew Haslett @theoccasional, and it underlies a great deal of what we've been talking about. Did people on the right of center get lazy and complacent about defending free markets after 1989? Is that why we've ended up where we are today?
Oh, I don't know. It depend, if you have, I, it depends who you're talking about. If you're talking about politicians, there's no question about it. I mean, when the first of, when Bush 41 talked about a kinder and gentler economy, I mean, that was the beginning of the downward spiral. when, his son started talking about compassionate conservatism, which does not mean compassionate to the taxpayer, by the way- No that was a further move in that direction. So lots of p- folks, when they got power, it was easier for the Republicans, for example, to do what the Democrats had done, use that power to do special favors for people here and there in hopes of gaining their political and financial support. Fine. they've now paid the price.
Dr. Thomas Sowell, author of The Housing Boom and Bust, thank you very much. I'm Peter Robinson. Be sure to follow us on Twitter at twitter.com/uncknowledge. That's U-N-C knowledge. send us your comments, links to related material, suggestions for guests. We'd love to hear from you. And now for Uncommon Knowledge and the Hoover Institution, thanks for joining us.
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